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Abstract: This paper clarifies and evaluates a premise of Wil-
liam Alston’s argument in  Perceiving God.1 The premise in 
question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic 
practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said 
practice is reliable. I first provide the background needed to 
understand how this  premise fits  into Alston’s  main argu-
ment. I then present Alston’s main argument, and proceed to 
clarify, criticize, modify, and ultimately reject Alston’s argu-
ment for the premise in question. Without this premise, Al-
ston’s main argument fails.
1.  
This section presents the main argument of Perceiving God, along 
with minimal necessary background. Alston’s thesis is that putative 
1
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perceptions of God often justify beliefs about God. A subject S has a 
putative perception of God when S has an experience e in which it 
seems to S that God appears to  S as Φ. If, based on e,  S forms the 
“M-belief” that God is Φ, then S has a justified belief that God is Φ. 
An M-belief is a belief that God is  Φ, which is based on a putative 
perception of God. (I will often substitute ‘q’ for the proposition that 
God is Φ.) 
Alston adopts a reliabilist theory of justification, which entails 
that justified beliefs are reliably produced. Thus, M-beliefs could be 
justified only if putative perceptions of God reliably indicate that 
God is Φ. In turn, this entails that M-beliefs could be justified only 
if God exists, for God could be Φ only if God exists. The stakes could 
hardly be higher: if Alston’s argument succeeds, then he will have 
established that God exists.1
In  order  for  S’s  M-belief  to  be  justified,  it  must  be  reliably 
caused, but S does not have to be justified in believing that it is reli-
ably caused. However, in order for Alston to convince us that S’s M-
belief  is justified, he must convince us of the second-order claim 
that S’s M-belief is reliably caused.
A doxastic practice is a habit, or cluster of habits, of forming 
doxastic  attitudes with certain contents,  when in certain circum-
stances. For instance, the doxastic practice of Sensory Perception is 
(roughly) the habit of forming the belief that  p when you have a 
sensory experience as of  p. There is also the practice of Christian 
Mystical Perception (CMP), which for simplicity we can say is the 
practice of forming M-beliefs.
Practical and Epistemic Justification 3
Those brief remarks put us in a position to appreciate Alston’s 
main argument.2
1. If CMP is a socially established doxastic practice, then it is 
prima facie practically rational to engage in it.3 (Premise)
2. If it is prima facie practically rational to engage in CMP, then 
it is prima facie epistemically rational to regard CMP as a re-
liable doxastic practice.4 (Premise)
3. If it is prima facie epistemically rational to regard CMP as a 
reliable doxastic practice, then if CMP both exhibits signific-
ant self-support and is not demonstrably unreliable (because 
of either massive internal inconsistency or pervasive conflict 
with some other, more firmly established doxastic practice), 
then it is unqualifiedly epistemically rational to regard CMP 
as a reliable doxastic practice.5 (Premise)
4. If it is unqualifiedly epistemically rational to regard CMP as a 
reliable doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to 
infer  that  an M-belief  that  q entails  that  q is  likely  true.6 
(Premise)
5. CMP is a socially established doxastic practice.7 (Premise)
6. It is prima facie practically rational to engage in CMP. (Mod-
us Ponens: 1, 5)
7. It is prima facie epistemically rational to regard CMP as a re-
liable doxastic practice. (Modus Ponens: 2, 6)
8. If  CMP  both  exhibits  significant  self-support  and  is  not 
demonstrably unreliable, then it is unqualifiedly epistemic-
ally rational  to regard CMP as a reliable doxastic practice. 
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(Modus Ponens: 3, 7)
9. CMP  both  exhibits  significant  self-support8 and  is  not 
demonstrably unreliable.9 (Premise)
10. It is unqualifiedly epistemically rational to regard CMP as a 
reliable doxastic practice. (Modus Ponens: 8, 9)
11. It is epistemically rational to infer that an M-belief that q en-
tails that q is likely true. (Modus Ponens: 4, 10)
12. Therefore, an M-belief that q entails that q is likely true.10 (By 
rational inference, 11)
Up until the last step, the argument is valid. The last step is not, 
strictly speaking, valid, but I will not quibble with it, because the in-
ference nevertheless appears persuasive.  Rather  than dispute the 
logic of the argument, I will argue against premise (2).
It  will  be  important  later  that  we understand Alston’s  target 
audience. He aims to “provide anyone, participant in CMP or not, 
with  sufficient  reasons  for  taking  CMP  to  be  rationally  engaged 
in.”11 The argument just reviewed is intended to answer an “external 
question,” to wit, “Why should we,” the community of epistemolo-
gists and other interested parties, “suppose that this whole way of 
forming and supporting beliefs is at all likely to give us true beliefs 
about reality?”12 We will not specifically address the “internal ques-
tion” of whether CMP is coherent and self-supporting.
2.  
Let us inquire into the supposed connection between practical and 
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epistemic justification. Let me first note that in the following dis-
cussion  ‘justification’  and  ‘rationality’  are  used  interchangeably, 
primarily because Alston himself slides back and forth between the 
two.  To  begin  with,  Alston  clearly  distinguishes  epistemic  from 
practical justification:
For one to be epistemically justified in holding 
a belief, as opposed to prudentially or morally 
justified is for it to be a good thing,  from the 
epistemic point of view, for one to believe that 
p. We may think of the epistemic point of view 
as defined by the aim at [sic] maximizing the 
number  of  one’s  true  beliefs  and  minimizing 
the number of one’s false beliefs.1
Epistemic justification, then, is concerned with truth, whereas 
practical  justification  is  primarily  concerned  not  with  truth,  but 
with prudential and moral considerations—e.g., with how well a be-
lief contributes to our success, happiness, rectitude, and so on.2 Giv-
en the inescapable difference between practical and epistemic justi-
fication,  Alston must concede that  there is  no  conceptual  entail-
ment from the former to the latter.3  He also concedes that the prac-
tical rationality of participating in a doxastic practice is not even 
evidence for its reliability.4
There  is  good  reason  to  deny  that  practical  justification 
provides evidence for reliability. Happiness might demand believ-
ing what is false. Perhaps some unremarkable people can be happy 
and successful only if they falsely believe that they possess stunning 
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looks, an incomparable intellect, or devastating charm. Or to take a 
more relevant case, due to their inability to cope with the stressful 
prospects of mortality and death, some people might come to prac-
tice a certain religion because it promises everlasting life, and they 
are much happier as a result. To take an actual case, pecuniary self-
interest no doubt perpetuated the belief among many 19th century 
slaveholders that black people were inherently inferior, naturally fit 
for slavery, indeed improved by the institution of slavery. We could 
multiply examples ad nauseum. The main point is that it is at least 
as plausible to assume that socially established doxastic practices 
persist because they make people “feel good” as it is to assume that 
they persist because they produce mostly true beliefs.
Given that we all agree that practical rationality is not evidence 
of reliability, it may come as a surprise that Alston nevertheless ac-
cepts premise (2), and urges us to accept it, too. I devote the re-
mainder of this paper to clarifying and evaluating his main argu-
ment for (2), what we may call “the argument from pragmatic im-
plication.”
We begin by distinguishing judgment from commitment.  If  I 
judge some doxastic practice α “to be rational[,] I am thereby com-
mitting myself to the rationality of judging  α to be reliable.”5 I do 
not actually thereby judge α to be reliable, but only commit myself 
to the rationality of supposing it  to be. What does that mean? It 
means that, were the question to arise, it would be irrational for me 
to disbelieve that it is reliable or suspend judgment on the matter. 
In such a circumstance, if I have any epistemic attitude toward the 
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proposition <α is reliable>, it must be that I judge that α is reliable, 
on pain of irrationality.
Alston  likens  this  to  Moore’s  Paradox.6 Something  would be 
seriously wrong with Jones were he to sincerely utter, “It’s raining, 
but I don’t believe it is.” The following propositions are logically in-
dependent:
13. It is raining (here, now).
14. I believe that it is raining (here, now).
(13) is logically consistent with the negation of (14). Neverthe-
less, it is plainly irrational for Jones to simultaneously assert (13) 
and deny (14). Call this a “Moore-paradoxical utterance.” While a 
Moore-paradoxical utterance is surely infelicitous, it also suggests 
an  epistemic  defect.  Something  has  gone  seriously  wrong  with 
Jones if he can express his belief that it is raining, while at the same 
time disbelieve that he has the belief just expressed.7 How could he 
be so disconnected from the very belief that he presently gives voice 
to? Alston believes that “this is just the situation we have with α is 
rational and it is rational to take α to be reliable.”8
Are the two cases similar? No. Moore’s Paradox raises a prob-
lem about an odd pair of beliefs, suggestive of epistemic failure, and 
which simultaneously cannot be expressed felicitously. Alston’s case 
presents neither symptom. Consider:
15. It is practically rational to engage in α.
16. I  believe that  α is  reliable [or:  α gives rise to  mostly  true 
beliefs].
Assenting to (15) while denying (16) does not suggest an epi-
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stemic failure. Neither does it strike me as odd or infelicitous. We as 
observers  can  concede  that  α is  a  long-standing,  socially  estab-
lished, widely accepted doxastic practice, and that people in certain 
circumstances can have overwhelming practical reason to particip-
ate in  α. Indeed, let us suppose that for them to shirk  α would be 
grossly negligent from the standpoint of practical reason. How does 
this relate to whether the resulting  α-beliefs are appropriate from 
the epistemic point of view? As far as I can see, it is irrelevant. Per-
haps  α prescribes  hasty  generalization  or  prejudicial  bias,  yet 
neither procedure appears likely to generate true beliefs.
(15) and (16) are neither conceptually, evidentially, nor other-
wise related in such a way that one cannot, from the epistemic point 
of view, justifiably believe (15) and deny (16). Likewise, nothing pre-
vents one from felicitously expressing both those beliefs in the same 
breath.9
This  demonstrates  that  (15)  need not  commit  an outsider  to 
(16). Hence, Alston fails to satisfactorily answer the external ques-
tion.10 Nevertheless, Alston might have a point to make regarding a 
slightly different question, a “quasi-external” question: why should 
we suppose that engaging in α will make it epistemically irrational 
for the participants of  α to deny that forming beliefs within  α is 
likely to result in true beliefs?11
Alston suggests an answer to the quasi-external question.
It is irrational to engage in α, to form beliefs in 
the ways constitutive of that practice, and re-
frain  from  acknowledging  them  as  true,  and 
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hence the practice as reliable,  if  the question 
arises.12
If one cannot engage in α and refuse to admit 
that  the  practice  is  reliable  if  the  question 
arises,  then in judging that  the former is  ra-
tional one has committed oneself to the latter’s 
being rational....13
It is the insiders, the participants of  α, who are bound by the 
pragmatic  implication.14 So  the  analogy  with  Moore’s  Paradox 
should consist of the following propositions:
(15') It is practically rational for me to engage in α.
(16) I believe that α is reliable [or: α gives rise to mostly true 
beliefs].
But  there  is  no  pragmatic  implication  here  either.  Suppose 
Smith recognizes that he has overwhelming practical reason to en-
gage in α, thus assenting to (15'). Now suppose that the canons of α 
make no pretension to reliability. The guiding epistemic principle of 
α is  to believe in accordance with the available evidence. Yet the 
canons of α also caution that we have no evidence whatsoever that 
believing in accordance  with the evidence is robustly truth-condu-
cive.  That  is  considered  a  “para-evidential”  question.  In  other 
words, we have no evidence that evidence is reliable, so we should 
suspend  judgment  on  whether  α is  reliable.  Accordingly,  Smith 
denies (16).15 Yet Smith is not thereby epistemically irrational. In-
deed,  according to the epistemic standards of the practice he has 
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most practical reason to engage in, α, he has come to the appropri-
ate conclusion.
Alston  might  respond  that  justification  entails  reliability,  so 
Smith could not consistently believe that he was justified in denying 
(16) while engaging in  α. But this assumes that Alston’s preferred 
reliabilist concept of justification applies across doxastic practices. 
However, this response is unavailable to Alston, for it explicitly con-
tradicts his view that there are no universal, inter-practice epistem-
ic standards.16
Thus far we have concentrated on arguments that would make 
epistemic conclusions fall out from considerations of practical ra-
tionality.17 This is apparently what Alston intends to prove, and in-
deed needs to prove in order for his argument to have any bearing 
on whether observers or participants of α should, from the epistem-
ic point of view, believe that α is reliable, and thereby conclude that 
first-order α-beliefs are reliably produced. But at the end of his ar-
gument for premise (2), Alston makes a baffling comment. He en-
tertains the same basic criticism of his view as I have been making, 
to the effect that he has “not shown that it is rational in an epistem-
ic sense that α is reliable.” Alston responds,
This  must  admitted.  We have not  shown the 
reliability attribution to be rational in a truth-
conducive sense of rationality, one that itself is 
subject to a reliability constraint. But that does 
not  imply  that  our  argument  is  without  epi-
stemic  significance.  It  all  depends  on  what 
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moves are open to us.  If  … we are unable to 
find noncircular indications of the truth of the 
reliability judgment, it is certainly relevant to 
show that it enjoys some other kind of rational-
ity.  It  is,  after  all,  not irrelevant to  our basic 
aim at believing the true and abstaining from 
believing the false, that α and other established 
doxastic practices constitute the most reason-
able procedures to use, so far as we can judge, 
when trying to realize that aim.18
This  response  either  misses  the  point  or  begs  the  question. 
First, when he claims, “it is certainly relevant to show that it enjoys 
some other kind of rationality,” what does he mean by ‘relevant’? 
The question  is  whether  practical  justification is  relevant  to  epi-
stemic justification, so merely asserting that it is begs the question. 
Second, when he states, “they are the most reasonable procedures 
to use, so far as we can tell,” what does he mean by ‘reasonable’? We 
granted for the sake of argument that they are the most practically 
reasonable,  but Alston was supposed to show us that this affects 
what is  most  epistemically reasonable (i.e.,  truth-conducive, reli-
able). Presumably, he isn’t simply reiterating what we have already 
assumed; otherwise, what is the point of making the argument? He 
apparently believes he establishes something more. If  that some-
thing concerns epistemic rationality, then he begs the question.
The most one can get out of Alston’s discussion is something 
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like the following principle.
17. IF it  is  practically  rational  for  S to  both engage in  α and 
suppose that if it is practically rational to engage in  α, then 
α-beliefs  are  reliably  produced  and  thereby  epistemically 
justified, THEN  S is practically rational in believing that  α-
beliefs are reliably caused and thereby epistemically justified.
But (17) does not serve Alston’s purpose. Replacing premise (2) 
with it would severely restrict his options. We could never get to the 
conclusion that M-beliefs are likely true. We could not even get the 
conclusion that participants of CMP are epistemically justified in 
believing that M-beliefs are likely true. The most we get is that they 
are practically rational in believing that they are epistemically justi-
fied in believing that M-beliefs are likely true. This conclusion, how-
ever, has no bearing on the epistemology of M-beliefs.
I  conclude that premise (2) of Alston’s argument is  false. No 
suitable replacement suggests itself. The main argument of Perceiv-
ing God fails.19
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1  William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experi-
ence (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press,  1991).  Unless  otherwise  noted, 
citations refer to this work.
1  Fully and formally spelled out, the reasoning in question would proceed 
as follows:
a. Religious  experience  provides,  to  the  subject  undergoing  it, 
justification for believing that God manifests himself. (Premise)
b. Religious  experience  provides,  to  the  subject  undergoing  it, 
justification  for  believing  that  God  manifests  himself  ONLY  IF 
religious  experience is  a  reliable  indication that  God manifests 
himself. (Premise—from the reliabilist theory of justification)
c. Religious experience is  a reliable indication that God manifests 
himself ONLY IF God exists. (Premise)
d. Therefore,  religious  experience  provides,  to  the  subject 
undergoing it, justification for believing that God manifests himself 
ONLY IF God exists. (Hypothetical Syllogism: b, c)
e. Therefore, God exists. (Modus Ponens: a, d)
Several quotes from Alston indicate this line of reasoning:
If putative perception of God can serve to justify beliefs about God’-
s perceivable qualities and activities, that tends to show that this pu-
tative perception is the genuine article.... We have to stop short of 
the claim that the perceptual justification of perceptual beliefs  en-
tails that the experience is genuine perception. I may be perceptu-
ally justified in believing that there is a lake in front of me even if I am 
a victim of a mirage and no lake is being perceived. But this is just 
an isolated incident that occurs against the background of innumer-
able cases in which perceptual justification involves authentic per-
ception of the object. It strains credulity to suppose that an entire 
sphere of putatively perceptual experience could be a source of 
justification for perceptual beliefs, while there is no, or virtually no, 
genuine perception of  the objects  involved.  Therefore,  if  putative 
experience of God provides justification for beliefs about God, that 
provides  very  strong support  for  supposing that  such experiences 
are, at least frequently, genuine perceptions of God.... [This all] de-
pends on whether the concept of justification involved exhibits ‘truth 
conducivity’, that is, on whether my being justified in believing that 
p entails that it is at least likely that it is true that p. Those who use a 
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non-truth-conducivity  conception  of  justification  will,  naturally 
enough, deny that the fact that sense experience provides justifica-
tion for beliefs about physical objects is a good reason for supposing 
that putative sense perception of physical objects is often the real 
thing.... But if, on the other hand, our conception of justification does 
exhibit  truth  conducivity,  as  mine  will,  the  argument  does  go 
through. If being based on putative perceptions of X renders beliefs 
about X likely to be true, it  must be that, in general,  such experi-
ences are in the kind of effective contact with facts about X that 
render them genuine perceptions of X. (pp. 68 – 9)
I want to address people who antecedently reject [the assumptions 
that people genuinely perceive God and that God exists] as well as 
those who accept [those assumptions].  Thus I  am conducting the 
discussion from a standpoint outside any practice of forming beliefs 
on the basis of those alleged perceptions. And so far as I can see, 
the only way of arguing, from that standpoint, that people do genu-
inely perceive God is to argue for the epistemological position that 
beliefs formed on the basis of such (putative) perceptions are (prima 
facie) justified. If that is the case, we have a good reason for regard-
ing many of the putative perceptions as genuine; for if the subject 
were not often really perceiving X[,] why should the experience in-
volved provide justification for beliefs about X? This reverses the usu-
al order of procedure in which we first seek to show that S really did 
perceive X and then go on to consider what beliefs about X, if any, 
are justified by being based on that perception. But we can pro-
ceed in that order only if we are working from within a perceptual 
belief-forming practice. The question of the genuineness of the al-
leged perception can be tackled from the outside only by defend-
ing the  epistemological  assumptions embedded in the practice in 
question. Thus the case for the reality of the perception of God will 
emerge from the book as a whole, most of which is one long argu-
ment for the thesis that certain kinds of beliefs about God can be 
justified by being based on putative perceptions of God. (p. 10)
I have been speaking in terms of epistemic justification, rather than 
in terms of knowledge, and the focus will  be on the former rather 
than the latter. This is partly because I can’t know that God is loving 
unless it is true that God is loving, and the latter in turn implies that 
God exists, something I will not be arguing in the book,  except by 
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way of arguing that some beliefs about God are justified. (p. 2, em-
phasis added)
2  See esp. pp. 194 and 278 – 279. I find those passages to be most helpful 
in understanding the book’s overall argument, even more so than the 
“Preview of Chapters” in the Introduction.
3  See Chapter 4, esp. pp. 149 – 150 and 168 – 169, for the general argu-
ment, and Chapter 5 for its application to CMP.
4  See Chapter 4, esp. pp. 168 – 170 and 178 – 180 for the general argu-
ment, and Chapter 5 for its application to CMP. In Alston’s own words, 
“The final conclusion I want to take from this chapter for use in the rest 
of the book—for any established doxastic practice it is rational to sup-
pose that it is reliable, and hence rational to suppose that its doxastic  
outputs are prima facie justified,” 183.
5  Chapter 5, esp. the “Conclusion” on p. 225. In the epistemology literat-
ure,  when speaking of  justification,  instead of  the term ‘unqualified’, 
some authors speak of ‘ultima facie’ or ‘all things considered’ justifica-
tion. See, e.g., James Pryor, “There is Immediate Justification,” in Matthi-
as Steup and Ernest Sosa, eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology 
(Blackwell, 2005), p. 183, and Matthias Steup,  An Introduction to Con-
temporary Epistemology (Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 40.
6  Chapter 2, esp. pp. 68 – 69.
7  Chapter 5.
8  Pp. 250 – 254.
9  Chapters 6 and 7.
10  See pp. 10, 68 – 69, 94.
11  P. 283. It is unclear whether anything remotely resembling Alston’s main 
argument would be acceptable to “mainline” Christians. Nevertheless, 
Alston certainly believes that his work could be relevant in the lives of 
mainline Christians. See the parable of Denise at the very end of the 
book, wherein Denise, “perhaps inspired by contemporary work in epi-
stemology,” is able to rekindle her dwindling faith, rejoin Christ’s flock, 
and reap the salvific blessings of the church.
12  P. 99. The external question is answered in Chapters 4 – 7, from which I 
have reconstructed what I call “Alston’s main argument.”
1  P. 72. (I added emphasis to ‘morally’ because consistency seems to call 
for it.)
2  Robert Nozick’s experience-machine example demonstrates that con-
siderations of truth do weigh on the scales of practical reason. But this is 
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accomplished only by holding all  other things equal. Consequently, it 
does not establish that considerations of truth are on a par with those of 
happiness, prudence, or morality; it only gets truth on the table. See No-
zick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), 42 – 45.
3  “It is clear that the [practical] rationality of a practice does not entail its 
reliability,” p. 178.
4  “I fail to discern any evidential tie; how could the practical rationality of 
engaging in SP be evidence for its reliability?” p. 178.
5  In what follows, I substitute ‘α’ where Alston uses ‘SP’. ‘SP’ is an acronym 
for the doxastic practice of forming beliefs on the basis of sensory ex-
periences.  Since  Alston  takes  this  argument  to  apply  to  all  doxastic 
practices, I want the discussion to proceed on the most general level. I 
also want  to avoid  letting  presumptions  regarding SP  creep into the 
evaluation of the argument.
6  Whereas this is not entirely clear in the body of the text, Alston expresses 
himself more clearly in notes 51 and 52 on pp. 179 and 180. As a referee 
pointed out, Alston does not use the name ‘Moore’ in those footnotes. 
However,  Alston’s  discussion  leaves  no  doubt  that  he  draws  heavily 
upon what is standardly referred to as “Moore’s Paradox,” so named 
after  G.E.  Moore.  Moore  originally  pointed out  that  it  is  exceedingly 
odd, even repugnant, to say, “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is.” Alston 
makes the point utilizing a different conjunction, “My car is in the gar-
age, but I don’t believe that it is.” Crucially, Alston points out, “This is just 
the situation we have with SP is rational and it is rational to take SP to be 
reliable,” and claims that both examples—the one about his garage, 
and the  one  about  the  doxastic  practice,  SP—are  examples  of  the 
same phenomenon: “pragmatic implication.” In light of all this, my cri-
tique  in  this  section  fairly  relies  on  important  dissimilarities  between 
Moore’s and Alston’s examples.  For an introduction to Moore’s Para-
dox, see  Moore’s Paradox:  New Essays on Belief,  Rationality, and the 
First Person (Oxford, 2007), ed. Mitchell S. Green and John N. Williams.
7  Contrast this with a case where Benny expresses his belief that it is rain-
ing, but lacks the belief that he believes that it is raining, because he 
lacks  the concept  BELIEF.  Perhaps  young  children  and sophisticated 
non-human animals are in this position. We can understand this—it does 
not puzzle us—and their failure to have, or express, the relevant second-
order belief indicates no epistemic failing on their part. Jones, by con-
trast, fully possesses the concept BELIEF, and expressly denies that he has 
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the first-order belief that he expresses in the same breath.
8  P. 180, n. 52.
9  At this point, it might be useful to distinguish my argument from Matthias 
Steup’s critique of Alston. Steup’s discussion proceeds by indicating sev-
eral points where “a skeptic about justification” could object to Alston’s 
argument. Steup faults Alston for the latter’s “preemptive” and “unjusti-
fied” treatment of the skeptic. In particular, Steup disagrees with Alston’s 
estimation that the skeptic is “irrational.” Steup’s response involves distin-
guishing levels of  epistemic commitment in order to show that Alston 
doesn’t fully appreciate the skeptic’s available resources. (Here Steup’s 
distinction may remind us of a similar distinction made by Keith Lehrer, 
who distinguishes mere belief from the more reflective and refined atti-
tude of  acceptance;  see Lehrer,  Theory of  Knowledge (Boulder,  CO: 
Westview Press, 1990).) See Matthias Steup’s critical study of Perceiving 
God in  Noûs,  vol.  31, no. 3 (1997),  pp. 408 – 420, esp. pp. 412 – 415 
(though I would be remiss if I failed to also direct the reader’s attention 
to the memorable example of the psychopathic killer castaways on p. 
417).
By contrast, my discussion proceeds independently of any invoca-
tion,  evaluation,  or  defense  of  skepticism,  including  the  distinction 
between levels  of  epistemic  commitment.  In  assessing  Alston’s  argu-
ment,  I  object on grounds that any native speaker  would recognize, 
which is, from my perspective, to the good.
10  To remind the reader, the external question is, “why should we [i.e., the 
community of epistemologists concerned with the rationality of religious 
belief] suppose that this whole way of forming and supporting beliefs is 
at all likely to give us true beliefs about reality?” p. 99.
11  I call this “quasi-external” because it is a question posed from the out-
side about those participating in the practice. Strictly speaking, it is dif-
ferent from a question posed from the outside about the practice itself. 
Perhaps this difference does not amount to much in the end, but I’m 
trying to give Alston every benefit of the doubt.
12  P. 179.
13  P. 179.
14  This  is the other reason I characterize Alston’s discussion at the most 
general level, substituting ‘α’ where Alston speaks of ‘SP’. We all particip-
ate in SP, so it is easy to confuse the external and quasi-external ques-
tions. Those of us observing (evaluating) the practice also participate in 
Practical and Epistemic Justification 18
it.  We might  easily  confuse what  we are committed to  as observers 
versus as participants. Regarding α, this is not an issue.
15  He does not utter ‘I disbelieve that α is reliable’, for that is not supported 
by the evidence. Instead, he utters ‘It is not the case that I believe that α 
is reliable’.
16  “Each practice … carries its own distinctive modes of justification, its 
own distinctive principles that lay down sufficient conditions for justifica-
tion, not only prima facie justification but also, though its overrider sys-
tem, unqualified justification as well.” There is no “underlying unity” to 
distinct doxastic practices. See p. 162, “The Irreducible Plurality of Prac-
tices.”
17  Philip Quinn criticizes Alston’s response to the problem of religious di-
versity, on what some might think are broadly similar grounds, so I will 
presently explain how my discussion differs from Quinn’s.
Quinn suggests that, upon being confronted with fundamental reli-
gious disagreement, instead of “sitting tight” with one’s antecedent reli-
gious beliefs, as Alston advocates, one might also reasonably adopt a 
Kantian view of religious belief. A Kantian view of religious belief has it 
that our culture or psychology deeply affects our understanding of ulti-
mate reality. We can never fully and accurately understand God, as he 
is in himself. As such, a modest and perfectly reasonable response to 
the epistemic problem posed by religious diversity would be to prune (or 
“thin,” as Quinn puts it) our theological commitments, so that we are no 
longer  in  fundamental  disagreement.  We  could  attribute  (at  least 
many) disagreements to our respective cultural or psychological differ-
ences. See Philip Quinn, “Towards Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on 
Religious Diversity,” reprinted in Philip Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., The 
Philosophical  Challenge  of  Religious  Diversity  (Oxford  University  Press, 
2000), pp. 226 – 243. 
Alston himself  considers  and rejects a proposal  along these lines, 
contending that  religious  people  are  decidedly  “pre-Kantian  in  their 
realist understanding of their beliefs.  They think that these beliefs em-
body true accounts of the Ultimate as it really is in itself and in its rela-
tions to the Creation,” 265.
My critique operates independently of the problem of religious di-
versity, and independently of the pre-Kantian/Kantian distinction and its 
attendant  controversy.  Accordingly,  my  critical  discussion  rests  on 
ground different from Quinn’s. My main critical points are aimed directly 
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at Alston’s positive argument for accepting the linkage between prac-
tical and epistemic justification, i.e., the argument from pragmatic im-
plication. Quinn’s case relies on a controversial characterization of the 
nature of religious belief, whereas my case relies primarily on what any 
competent native speaker would, or would not, recognize as an infeli-
citous utterance.
18  P. 180.
19  For feedback and discussions that helped improve this paper, I thank 
Allan Hazlett, Bruce Russell, Ernest Sosa, an anonymous referee, and the 
Editor of this Journal. 
